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Abstract  
 
 
The effects of illicit use of tax havens and tax arrangements on governments and the global 
economy has influenced international tax arena to be scrutinised and changed with three main 
problems addressing this need. Firstly, governments are losing and being robbed of their tax 
money by large corporations and wealthy individuals through means of illegal and aggressive 
tax optimisation. Secondly, as governments are reacting to the abuse, businesses are being 
investigated and this creates more expense such as seeking new ways to arrange their 
structures and operate their business. Thirdly, as tax changes are made in the international 
sphere, companies, individuals and governments will be influenced subsequently and thus one 
has to be aware and be ready to adapt to the upcoming novelties.   
To analyse these problems, the thesis aims to cover a specific period which was the start for 
significant changes in the tax haven industry, thus influencing the international taxation. In 
order to answer a research question is proposed of whether the legal and business structure 
and the views on tax havens have changed after 2008 compared to today and what are the 
peculiarities thereof impacting today's businesses and tax haven jurisdictions.  
Complementing with a hypothesis, proposing that the world's tax haven position due to global 
tax optimization and jurisdictional transparency issues has changed, especially with 
significances made within the period of 2008 until 2018, influenced by international leaders. 
Which in turn, changes previous functioning of companies and individuals regarding the 
usage of tax havens, with tax haven jurisdictions amending their principles and laws. 
It is estimated that trillions are hidden in tax havens and lost from worldwide national tax 
budges, creating inequality between the middle-class and lower-class citizens who pay 
proportionally more taxes than the wealthy. Major shifts have been made and currently 
controlled by the regulator in the EU, thus impacting all the member states and all those 
stemming from the advancements made by the international leader’s countries.  
The thesis is structured in a way for the reader to comprehend the building of the topic. 
Starting with analysing the definition of the term offshore tax haven, which does not have a 
one common definition, in order to lay down a fundament for the thesis and to resolve 
ambiguities. Additionally, addressing other means for businesses and investors to use tax 
havens than those for solely tax optimisation.  
Continuing the research with legal analysis split into the international arena perspective 
studying legal and political measures, such as steps taken by the G20 and the OECD creating 
a reform within the international tax industry. On the other hand, the EU perspective made in 
a form of a timeline analysing new legal acts made and proposed within the effective 
taxation, tax transparency and better business environment spheres tackling the avoidance 
with third countries and within the internal market of the EU, supplemented with scholarly 
opinions, cases and examples. Concluding with case examinations to illustrate the analysis 
and consequences from the former chapters.  
Consequently, the research has approved its hypothesis that the world's tax haven position has 
changed due to global tax optimization arrangements and jurisdictional transparency issues 
these changes were influenced by global organizations and large economy countries with 
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especially significant changes made starting with the period of 2008 until today. Additionally, 
business and individual functioning has changed with new laws, current tax arrangements are 
being scrutinised and tax haven jurisdictions are being categorized as cooperative and non-
cooperative, thus implying for further tax changes within the national tax systems.  
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Thesis Introduction 
 
European Commission’s Vice-President for the Euro and Social Dialogue Valdis 
Dombrovskis stated on tackling tax avoidance in 2016:  
“Today we are taking another step to strengthen confidence in the entire tax system, 
making it fairer and more efficient. People have to trust that the tax rules apply 
equally to all individuals and businesses. Companies must pay their fair share of taxes, 
where their actual economic activity is taking place. Europe can be a global leader in 
tackling tax avoidance.”1 
New investigations and steps have been taken towards disclosing the true nature behind the 
shadowed curtains.  As in this case behind hidden funds in tax havens and structured tax 
arrangements through different countries, which is a common practice for the wealthy who 
hide the true beneficiary and their true value.  
From the 2008 crisis and the disclosure of offshore leaks, the world’s tax haven users are 
being investigated and these jurisdictions forced transparency, following with company tax 
arrangement disclosure with fines for their practices and individuals imprisoned. These 
changes were influenced by global powers such as the G20, OECD and strong steps taken by 
the EU since 2015 whom declare to strive their efforts towards balance and fairness regarding 
the wealth and taxation inequality.  
The key advantage for companies to use offshore tax havens is that it creates tax advantage 
which means more revenue and lower competition with the true beneficiaries safeguarding 
their wealth. It must be noted that using a tax haven is legal, however once it is exploited 
through tax avoidance or tax evasion it becomes a concern for countries which are deprived 
from their taxable incomes.  Thus, offshore banking is not illegal, however hiding money is. 
As estimated by Gabriel Zucman, around 10% of worlds GDP is held in offshores which 
translates in around 9 trillion euros lost worldwide in taxes for governments.   
The thesis will tackle these issues, cases and utmost importantly the progressive impacts and 
legal changes made after 2008 by international powers and by the European legislator, with 
analysis made in a form of a timeline supplementing with scholarly opinions and cases to 
illustrate the changes and arguments within the offshore industry and international taxation 
today. The business aspect of the thesis is to examine the impact and the changes which were 
made on companies using tax arrangements and the legal aspect analysing international 
recommendations, EU regulations and measures taken by the global powers to tackle the 
issue of tax avoidance worldwide. 
The thesis will answer the research question of whether the legal and business structure and 
the views on tax havens have changed after 2008 compared to today and the peculiarities 
thereof impacting todays businesses and tax haven jurisdictions. 
In addition, researching the hypothesis that the world’s tax haven position due to global tax 
optimisation and jurisdictional transparency issues has changed, especially with significant 
changes made within the period of 2008 until 2018, influenced by international leaders. In 
                                                 
1
 Launch of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package: Tackling Tax Avoidance. Available on : 
https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/launch-of-the-anti-tax-avoidance-package-tackling-tax-avoidance-european-
commssion-daily-news/. Accessed May 10, 2018 
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turn changing the previous functioning of businesses and individuals regarding the usage of 
tax havens, leading tax haven jurisdictions to amend their laws and principles. 
Structure and Scope 
To gain a comprehensive overview of the current international taxation and the offshore 
industry position, the thesis is framed in a form of a timeline between 2008 and 2018 in order 
to accomplish answering the research question.  As well as to reduce the possible gaps within 
this period which are relevant to the thesis analysis.  
Moreover, given the unique taxation systems and the asymmetric advancements between each 
country, the research will instead focus and study the international legal and business 
assessment and the regional EU’s perspective on its tax system and the usage of tax havens. 
As, the international frameworks are the basis for national legislation subsequently.  
The aspects covered will consist of the definition of tax haven, tax evasion and avoidance, 
along with ways of operating an offshore incorporation with means other than purely tax 
optimisation to show different sides to these practices. Following with the main analysis of 
the thesis concerning the international perspectives and influences on tax haven industry with 
discussion about the USA’s position and the offshore leaks which were a significant finding 
causing the shift of the industry.  
Enduring with studying the position and significances within the European Union regarding 
its taxation and the relationship with offshore tax havens, with changes covering the effective 
taxation, tax transparency and better business environment. Concluding with the final chapter 
of case examinations introducing the consequences in practice.    
Thus, the study will begin with a discussion of the definition and operation scope, this will be 
followed by a legal and business analysis making the most of the thesis, including a context 
and a timeline of the international perspectives and their mechanisms in place. Concludingly, 
the thesis will be followed by relevant cases and finished with a conclusion and opinions 
further to be examined. 
Methodology 
The research and methodology primarily used for shaping the thesis is stemmed from the 
doctrinal research by gathering scholarly and legal practitioner writing and opinions for 
analysing and researching the law, international treaties, international measures and 
recommendations. As well as, the use of data from EU press release, recognised media 
researches, research work from international organisations and its analysis about the topic of 
the  of offshore industry and its causation to international taxation.  
Along with parts of interdisciplinary research as the thesis analyses legal measures and 
significances and business factors such the impact on companies and individuals and the 
situation in the business environment caused by the changes within the offshore tax haven 
industry and the changes in international tax law. As well as, the teleological research for 
examining the legal texts according to their purpose and sense for the legal context in order to 
show which laws have been changed, how they were changed and what are their impact on 
the businesses and legal environment.   
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Part I. Scope and Operations  
1. Definitions 
As with any legal regulation or contract, in order to grasp the essence of each article it is 
crucial to understand the meaning of the used terms within. Consequently, the subchapter 
Definition will lay a fundamental distinction and a meaning for understanding the term tax 
haven and offshores on the first subchapter and the difference of tax evasion and avoidance in 
the following subchapter. The following parts and chapters shall be based on the 
understanding of these concepts, thus before covering the vehicle of tax haven one has to 
understand what it means.  
 
a) Tax Haven vs Offshore Financial Centers 
Due to a common misunderstanding of the distinction and meanings, as well as not having 
one official and definitive definition of the term tax haven and an offshore tax haven a basal 
framework and fundamental understanding for the reader the term will be examined under 
this chapter, this is to ensure that the terms are understood and can be used for building the 
thesis and the research. 
With international globalization of the world’s financial development and a trend for further 
globalization, accompanied with a lack of international coordination and control of fiscal 
affairs, as sated by Mykola Orlov individuals and companies take advantage of these possible 
gaps and omit taxes with a so-called vehicle - tax haven. This is not a novel phenomenon, it is 
already used by incorporations for more than eighty years and making in turn states struggle 
by not gathering their full tax system levies, thus with time moving states are progressively 
fighting more against these types of vehicles.
2
  
There is however no official and clearly used one definition yet there are variants from 
various sources and scholars trying to define it. Essentially, under a black’s law dictionary 
definition of tax haven is a country with a negligible income tax which is other than the 
incorporators or beneficiaries’ original country, which is offering financial services and has 
higher secrecy policies regarding the incorporations and fund safeguarding, which thus makes 
it very incentivized for foreign investors to move and keep their capital in such places.
3
 
Furthermore, the definition expands by adding a secrecy element to it, where tax haven is also 
referred to as a secrecy jurisdiction which ‘’provides facilities that enable people or entities 
escape or undermine the laws, rules and regulations of other jurisdictions elsewhere, using 
secrecy as a prime tool.’’4 Thus, protecting personal financial information in terms of the 
company’s beneficiaries, their income sources and their income flows. Also, tax haven ‘’can 
be defined as any jurisdiction that has preferential rules for foreign investors.’’5 This is done 
                                                 
2
 Mykola Orlov, ‘’The Concept of Tax Haven: A Legal Analysis’’ Volume 32 Intertax, Issue 2, (2004): p. 95 
3
 Offshore Haven Definition, available on: https://thelawdictionary.org/offshore-haven/. Accessed April 17, 
2018. 
4
 Secrecy Jurisdiction definition, available on: https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/faq/what-is-a-secrecy-
jurisdiction. Accessed March 21, 2018. 
5
 Tax Haven Definition, available on: https://www.theage.com.au/news/business/here-is-the-truth-about-tax-
havens/2007/10/15/1192300685572.html. Accessed March 21, 2018. 
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by modifying their tax laws for the purpose of being more attractive to foreign investment and 
consequently attracting it, interestingly their citizens have different tax plans.  
U.S. Government Accountability Office has set out characteristics in semblance from 
organizations and institutional researchers to identify which jurisdiction can be qualified as a 
tax haven, as follows ‘’no or nominal taxes; a lack of effective exchange of information with 
foreign tax authorities; and a lack of transparency in legislative, legal, or administrative 
provisions’’ likewise also those jurisdictions which are referring to themselves as offshore 
financial centers or financial privacy jurisdictions.
6
  
Lastly, the demolition in the EU is, as stated ‘’The parliament backed a common international 
definition of what constitutes a tax haven, an offshore financial center, secrecy haven, non-
cooperative tax jurisdiction and a high-risk country.’’7 The meaning of a high-risk country is 
seen as a third country which has faulty institutional and legal frameworks with low standards 
for controlling money flows into their countries and thus establishes significant risks and 
threats to the financial system of the EU.
8
   
On the other hand, offshore financial centers (OFC’s) are described by IMF as ‘’a country or 
jurisdiction that provides financial services to nonresidents on a scale that is incommensurate 
with the size and the financing of its domestic economy.’’9 With characteristics such as that 
the main orientation is towards nonresidents; they have minimal information disclosure and a 
law environment with poor supervisory requirements and; they have zero or low taxation 
schemes. Above all these jurisdictions or countries are very specialized in the supply of 
financial services exceeding the size of their economic needs.
10
  
Notably, the characteristics and definitions between tax haven and OFC is very similar and 
their nature is virtually the same with an aim to gain more beneficial and confidential taxation 
scheme for their business conduct. However, noting that these are legal structures, unless they 
are hiding something illegally gained or made.  
Thus, in the view of this thesis the term tax haven will be used in the following 
understanding. Describing a vehicle used by individuals or companies in a foreign or offshore 
jurisdiction or country, which has modified its laws to attract foreign investors, granting 
higher level of confidentiality and secrecy towards their banking transaction endeavors and 
contribute to other benefits (seen further in thesis). Essentially an aim to obtain benefits 
which otherwise in their jurisdictions could not be obtained, thus gaining business 
competitive advantage.  
 
                                                 
6
 "International Taxation: Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions 
Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions’, available on: 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/290/284522.pdf. Accessed March 21, 2018. 
7
 Tax Haven Definition, available on: https://euobserver.com/economic/140279 and   
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tax-common-eu-list_en. Accessed March 22, 2018. 
8
 EP and of the Council by identifying high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies, available on: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2016.254.01.0001.01.ENG. Accessed 
March 22, 2018. 
9
 ‘’Concept of Offshore Financial Centers: In Search of an Operational Definition’’, available on: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0787.pdf. Accessed March 22, 2018. 
10
 Ibid.  
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b) Tax Evading vs Tax Avoidance  
Argued by Arthur J. Cockfield tax evasion with the use of tax havens is a situation when the 
taxpayer intentionally is not disclosing one’s income or assets to his or her tax authority and 
thus gaining income without tax hidden, this a criminal offence.
11
 Consequently, by violating 
laws and not paying taxes constitutes a criminal conduct. 
In the EU tax evasion occurs when, firstly, the public budget of the member state is deprived 
of its money that companies or individuals gained from not paying taxes. Secondly, the 
practices of storing money offshore and potentially done so untaxed and unreported is a 
violation. Thirdly, by aggressive tax planning which are pushing the limits and definitions of 
the laws in the sense of interpreting normal tax planning into something which it is not and 
searching for loopholes. These practices limit the capacities of the member states to 
progressively implement their social and economic policies and in turn creating loses in the 
budget.
12
 
On the other hand, argued by Jean Murray the term tax avoidance is a tax minimisation 
arrangement which is done legally within the tax codes of the countries or jurisdictions.
13
 
Hence, as long as these tax arrangements are done within the system of law they are allowed, 
and it can be done in tax arrangements through a tax haven jurisdiction, however the line 
between pushing on its limits can be subtle. Individuals and companies equipped with the 
tools to do this use the opportunity and are not conducting illegal activities. However, from 
the schools of tax morality Zoe and John Prebble argues that these activities are undermining 
moral and fairness principles from the standpoint of political and economic arena, until the 
decency to everyday workers who pay their taxes with each hard-earned salary.
14
 Thus, the 
question of ethics and corporate responsibilities is to be raised and bringing about the 
subsequent research on operations made by using and offshore tax haven which are not solely 
focused on gaining tax benefits.  
 
2. Operating an Offshore Tax Haven 
As follows from the understanding of the definition, it is important to tackle and add to the 
above mentioned practical benefits and reasons to why individuals and companies choose to 
risk and go through the legal and financial expenses to incorporate in a tax haven. Assessed 
from research made by scholars and law practitioners such as James McConville and Michael 
J. Burns. This is very important to understand as one due to media is exposed only to the 
negative side of using a tax haven, as this is what brings ratings, such as tax evading and the 
means of hurting tax payers but there is another side to tax havens and the motives behind 
incorporating which will be examined in this chapter. 
                                                 
11
 Cockfield, Arthur J., ‘’Bid Data and Tax Haven Secrecy’’ Florida Tax Review, Vol. 18, Issue 8 (2016): p. 488 
12
 Tax Fraud and Evasion, available on: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/fight-against-tax-fraud-tax-
evasion/a-huge-problem_en. Accessed March 24, 2018. 
13
 Jean Murray, ‘’What Is the Difference Between Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion?’’, available on: 
https://www.thebalance.com/tax-avoidance-vs-evasion-397671. Accessed March 24, 2018. 
14
 Z. Prebble, J. Prebble. ‘’The Morality of Tax’’, available on: 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/creigh43&div=29&g_sent=1&casa_token=lCup5iCy0iA
AAAAA:j351bohgTkrQwhtAhxa4DOsPSqPq1i_nCGgFAWgIEH3Nuw6HZ7ZDU9WmGtkcnAAcuHDKX27n
dA&collection=journals. Accessed March 25, 2018. 
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a) Joint Venture Vehicles  
In a business situation of more than one owner from more than one country or when many 
investors come together to fund a project, each have an incentive to be protected in case their 
rights are infringed. Therefore, to avoid ‘’home court advantages’’ or other strict restriction 
owners and investors seek a neutral jurisdiction.  
Such as, in the case proposed by Charles Jennings where there is an energy project from 
South Africa or a finance management project from Eastern Europe, investors would prefer to 
invest and manage from a neutral jurisdiction which is known to them. If there are four joint 
ventures’ in one’s jurisdiction, the three others might be disadvantaged and disagree to fund 
in this case it would be fair to seek an offshore tax haven which is completely neutral.
15
 
Thus, as stated by Matthew Gilbert and Joanna Russell using an offshore tax haven to 
separate from the location of business place and adding a place of simplified tax regulations 
creates more comfortable conditions for joint ventures to conduct their business activities and 
not to worry about the rules of the jurisdiction which they are not familiar with, because using 
offshore tax havens are usual practice and hence they are all familiar with the specific 
jurisdiction laws.
16
 
Furthermore, due to simplified nature of the offshore tax haven investors are willing to invest 
in the joint venture. For example, investors are reluctant to invest directly into the US 
companies due to class action litigations in the USA and this creates reluctance. Above all, 
typically, professionals and regulators in tax havens are very efficient and responsive to the 
needs of businesses and thus creating it very comfortable for investors to be aware of their 
venture investment. 
As James McConvill concludes this would not only make it favourable for the initial investors 
to manage their investment from offshore tax haven, but this would also encourage other 
potential investors to be involved in case any additional funding is needed for the business.
17
 
 
b) Raising Money on Financial Markets  
Incorporating in an offshore tax haven can help in raising capital on leading financial markets, 
such as London and New York, this can create very favorable capital source for the business, 
however not all countries and jurisdictions are politically and economically stable which 
creates reluctant for market investors to invest, thus by incorporating in an offshore tax haven 
this issue is removed and investors can solely focus on the analysis of the business entity 
itself. Also, many investors are familiar with popular tax havens, because they are regularly 
                                                 
15
 Charles Jennings, ‘’A Healthy Economy Needs Offshore Financial Centres’’ available on: 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/01/offshore-banking-caymans-g20-opinions-contributors-tax-havens.html. 
Accessed March 27, 2018. 
16
 Matthew Gilbert ‘’Cross border’’ Available on: https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-624-
3423?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1.  Accessed March 27, 2018. 
17
 James McConvill, ''An Unstoppable Force Rather Than an Illegitimate Farce: Exploring the Role of Offshore 
Financial Centres Amid Renewed Criticism'' European Business Law Review, vol. 25, issue 6 (2014): 881 - 882, 
pp. 
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used for debt and equity raising in these markets with these remarks made by James 
McConvill.
18
  
Additionally, added by Phillip Inman tax havens are also regularly used to finance and to 
raise capital on the major stock exchange listings such as New York Stock Exchange, London 
Stock Exchange and its Alternative Stock Exchanges, as well as Singapore and Hong Kong 
Stock Exchanges. Thus, an offshore tax haven is allowed to be listed on major stock 
exchanges just as companies onshore.
1920
 
When incorporating a popular strategy to use is one through special purpose vehicle (SPV), as 
noted by Erik Stafford where the company transfers assets to the SPV for management or to 
finance the company’s goals without putting its capital a risk. SPV which is a subsidiary to 
the parent company is separate from the originator’s balance sheet with an objective to help 
protect the main assets in case the company would face bankruptcy or as such financial 
pressures. This practice isolates the credit risk liabilities from the originator’s balance sheet. 
Which is welcoming for the investors.
21
 
It must also be added that offshore tax havens are a very important vehicle in relation to 
mutual funds. Because money is pooled in from many investors and then can be invested 
different ways, such as bonds, different money-market instruments, stocks, other securities, or 
even cash.
22
 
 
c) Offshore Entities as Securitization Vehicles 
Securitization is a process of companies financial restructuring which occurs by pooling 
together various contractual debts such as credit debts, mortgages, debt obligations, 
repackaging them and selling them out as securities and in return receiving funds very fast 
which is lessening the liability impact on the company’s balance sheet thus showing a 
favourable credit rating and investors in turn gain principal and interest cash flows from this 
investment. It cannot be forgotten that the income stream form selling these securities as they 
are based on a low tax jurisdiction are very beneficial for the company. 
The issuer (investor) is designed to be ‘’bankruptcy remote’’ because in case of financial 
problems or bankruptcy the companies (originators) assets are first hand paid off to the 
issuers and only then what is left distributed to the originators. As perceived by James 
McConvill the distribution process is conducted through an ‘’arranger’’ which usually is an 
investment bank or an entity of such kind.
23
 
                                                 
18
 Ibid. 884, p.  
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Phillip Inman ‘’ Nearly 400 LSE-listed companies based in tax havens linked to UK’’, available on: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/12/london-stock-exchange-listed-companies-tax-havens-uk. 
Accessed April 3, 2018. 
21
 Coval Joshua, Jakub Jurek, and Erik Stafford. "The Economics of Structured Finance." Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 23 (1) 2009, pp. 5-6. available on: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.23.1.3. 
Accessed April 3, 2018. 
22
 US Securities & Exchange Commission’s summary on mutual funds.  
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersmutfundhtm.html. Accessed April 6, 2018. 
23
 James McConvill, above nr. 16, p. 885.  
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The way the separation operation works as described by Christopher Bickley is in order to 
move the assets from originator to the SPV and then typically depart the shares is through a 
trust established in the offshore jurisdiction. The form of the trust would commonly be either 
a purpose trust or a charitable trust. Purpose trust must provide definite beneficiaries or 
objects or charitable objects.
 24
 In the BVI, section 84 (2) of the Trustee Act (Chap. 303) 
provides that a person is valid for a trust for any purpose as long as “the purpose is specific, 
reasonable and possible” and “the purpose is not immoral, contrary to public policy or 
unlawful”.25 As seen, these are quit wide prescription, due to which companies are very keen 
on using them.  
 
d) Director and Shareholder Information  
Tax havens have been pressured to implement automatic exchange of information rules and to 
publicly disclose the beneficiaries and directors of the companies but most of the tax havens 
have worked hard to ensure that they not only meet but also exceed the expectations of 
international standards in this area of AML and anti‐ money laundering terrorist financing 
code of practice
26
, yet as recognised by James McConvill still ensuring the shareholder non-
public confidentiality.
27
 
In order to register in the tax haven sufficient information must be given to the company 
register agent to take steps towards incorporation of the company. In order to ensure safe-
guard of their and international policies. Accordingly, most tax havens are party to OECD’s 
tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) where member of the agreement provide 
exchange of information on request relating to a civil tax investigation of a specific criminal 
investigation, this is to address harmful tax practices.
28
 
Thus, the degree of secrecy on behalf of the shareholders and director’s information does not 
mean that tax havens operate with criminals and keeping other jurisdictions in the dark. 
Instead they are sensitive to the client’s personal welfare and respecting wishes of them 
separating their personal and business affairs. 
Lastly, in order to visualize the usage of tax haven with SPV in practice it would be as 
follows. Shareholders of a company A would either establish an offshore SPV or a trust 
called B in a tax haven or buy A through B for the means of financing and controlling the 
existing business A. Thus, allowing the shareholders to gain certain tax, foreign exchange, 
flexibility and safe guarding benefits. On the other hand, for the individuals it could be a 
significant way to protect assets such as in an emergency situation developed at home 
country, such as political or financial like the bank closure of Parex in Latvia and money 
stored abroad privately can be free from home government’s influence.  
                                                 
24
 Christopher Bickley, ‘’Bermuda, British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands Company Law’’ 4rd edition, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2013. p, 386.  
25
 BVI Trustee Act, 1961, Chapter 303. Available on: http://gmjones.org/pdfs/grant-jones-trusts-arbitrator-
specialist-bvi-trust-act-1961.pdf. Accessed April 4, 2018. 
26
 Available online at the BVI Financial Services Commission’s website here: http://www.bvifsc.vg/en-
us/guidance/policiesandguidelines.aspx. Accessed April 4, 2018. 
27
 James McConvill, above nr. 16, p. 886. 
28
 Tax Information Exchange Agreements. http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm. Accessed April 4, 2018. 
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Part I Conclusion  
As read above, this part is concerned with creating a legal, business and academic 
understanding framework from the opinions and acknowledgments made by James 
McConvill, Mykola Orlov, Christopher Bickley, Erik Stafford, Charles Jennings, Zoe and 
John Prebble and others. Firstly, in detail comprehending the meaning of offshore tax havens 
which are vehicles for more efficient business conduct and adding the meaning of tax evasion 
for the overall context for tax havens and that offshore should not mean criminal but rather 
international or overseas. Secondly, in order to continue the thesis, it was of utmost 
importance to describe other means of using offshore tax havens, besides that of media 
pushed reason for mainly tax evading and forgoing national tax schemes, showing that not all 
companies and individuals using offshore tax havens are in the black list and unethical.  
Some of the benefits are the possibility to for businessman to work together in a more 
efficient joint venture, pooling investors and therefore raising capital for the company to work 
with, possibility of restructuring by securitization for safeguarding assets for the investors and 
doing so by the means of special purpose vehicle. Lastly, because the tax haven industry is 
competitive, and each tax haven wants the money flow through their jurisdiction, it creates 
cost diminishment and ease of use as professionals are available very fast and costs are kept 
as low as possible for incorporating and maintenance, due to the aforementioned motivation. 
In the following chapter, the research will examine the past (from 2008) and current positions 
and international changes of the offshore tax haven industry on an international perspective.   
14 
 
 
 
Part II. Legally Influencing the Tax Haven Industry Internationally 
The concept of tax havens, probably in a different word and meaning, has been around since 
countries decided to finance their government through taxation. In the first recorded instance, 
even Ancient Rome was a master of tax free zones, as they established a tax-free port in the 
island of Delos and the Greek island state of Rhodes quickly lost their commercial power.
29
 
Contemporarily tax-competitions also prevails, however as internationalism and global 
powers are driving the world’s economy, tax havens act as a vehicle working counter to 
powers’ interests. In this part the research will analyse the global powers and their driving 
forces, interests and actions against the non-cooperative jurisdictions and the implications 
thereof.  
1. Global Impact on Tax Havens 
a)  The Global Powers in Combating Tax Havens 
G20 is an international conference consisting of finance ministers and central bank governors 
from twenty major economies, with an aim to address issues which reach beyond just one 
organization or economy. With a responsibility to promote international financial stability, 
international trade, economic growth and financial market regulation.
30
 Additionally, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a United Nations body, 
also an organisation which is committed to stimulate economic progress internationally and 
world trade, coordinate international policies and seek to answer common economic 
problems. Also consisting of world leader countries. In 2008, October 22, OECD draw up a 
black list of tax havens, from a decision made by the G20, targeting and investing hidden and 
undeclared revenues and tax frauds.
31
 Both of these organisations played a crucial role in the 
shift of the tax haven industry today, further elaborated below.  
Since the global financial crisis in 2008, G20 has stated that tax payers should never again 
pay for bailing out financial market participant, as it then happened. The G20 states have been 
focused on strengthening global financial system and on the improvement of supervision and 
regulation of the financial market participants, including those known under the shadow 
banking system (including tax havens) with an aim that none of the financial market 
participants remain unsupervised, thus tackling harmful tax competition between countries or 
jurisdiction and aggressive tax policies adopted by firms.
 32
 
With Steven J. Klees arguing that tax justice is the solution with the financial problems in 
countries and the world. That due to these actions the main victims are the next generations as 
the funding for education is not enough and most states even now can increase these funding. 
As well as, there is an upmost need to tackle tax avoidance and contribute to more stringent 
ways of dealing with these issues and removing the possibility for prevalence of harmful tax 
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arrangement incentives.
33
 Additionally, as stated by Leonce Ndikumana tax havens facilitate 
illegal capital holding, transaction and creates a major issue for countries as revenue loss, thus 
as the wealthy do not pay taxes this creates further inequality.
34
 
 
On the other side of the spectrum there are also opposing views from scholar Daniel J. 
Mitchell arguing for the usage and importance of tax havens, that this would hinder tax 
competition between countries. Along with Ben Ferrett writing that otherwise government 
and firm interactions are very static and only in one location with decreases growth for 
globalism.
35
 Thus, such as the US-based Centre for Freedom and Prosperity (CFP), 
established as a direct response to the OECD initiative to fully supervise tax havens, in the 
1998 by the Heritage Fund. The organisation aims to support low taxation and tax 
competition, and supporting it as a manifestation of market liberalisation, also arguing that 
OECD is a group of high-taxation countries with strong economies shielding themselves from 
economic competition which other jurisdictions can offer.
36
  
It has been written by Ronen Palan CFP played a major role in 2001 for the Bush 
administration to pull of resources to support the OECD project for improving transparency 
of financial flows, and thus leaving it without a major progress until the need to focus on this 
issue after the financial crisis in 2008.
37
 Today, however, OECD is the main international 
organization for setting worldwide standards for economic progress and taxation.  
b)  The Progress of Combating Tax Havens Globally 
Following the above mentioned, in 2 April 2009 G20 London Summit an action plan was 
declared stating that the era of banking secrecy is over. This was done by creating an official 
document ‘’Global Plan for Recovery and Reform’’ thus moving action towards non-
cooperative jurisdiction, and in particular tax havens. This action plan was taken to restore 
confidence and trust in the global financial systems, expressing that there will be a built more 
globally consistent, stronger supervisory and regulatory framework for future financial sector.  
It was agreed to, establish a new Financial Stability Board; collaborate with IMF to provide 
early macroeconomic warnings; reshape the regulatory systems; extend oversight to financial 
important institutions, instrument and markets; endorse social responsibility for all firms and 
implement compensation; improve quantity, quality and international consistency of capital in 
the banking system; take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions (against those 
jurisdiction listed as non-cooperative tax havens published by OECD); and improve global 
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accounting standards.
38
 As these goals stated officially next step is to analyze the advance of 
them in actual practice over the years. 
After the 2009 summit it was agreed to redefine together with the OECD a blacklist for non-
cooperative jurisdiction or tax havens (first blacklist was made in 2000), the list was dealt 
into 3 tiers based on the implementation progress of internationally agreed tax standards. 
White-list jurisdictions that has implemented the standards, Grey-list a jurisdiction committed 
but not yet implemented the standards and, a Black-list – jurisdictions which have not 
committed to implement these standards and no steps have been taken to cooperate with the 
OECD standards.
39
  
Rise of French-Swiss Treaty 
In August 2009, as France is part of the G20 countries and Switzerland directly connected as 
being part of the EU and also a known as a tax haven in the EU 
40
, amended their French-
Swiss tax treaty by agreeing to exchange all necessary information for tax enforcement upon 
request, this also included the major step towards transparency, exchange of Swiss bank 
information amending their banking secrecy law which was first codified in 1934.  
Due to this, in 2010 a famous French case ‘’Affaire Bettencourt’’ arose (the impact was 
already earlier in 2009 after tax treaty amendment) involving hiding and moving of the 
billionaires Ms. Bettencourt funds from France in Switzerland and illegal payments and 
schemes made with the French government. Tapes of conversations between Ms. Bettencourt 
and her financial wealth adviser were disclosed about transferring her funds worth around 
$160 million from Switzerland, as it had become too risky to keep the money in Swiss Banks, 
she was advised to move her funds to a tax havens where exchange of information with 
France would not be committed, such as Hong Kong, Singapore or Uruguay. After the tapes 
were made public the funds were repatriated by France.
41
 She was alleged for tax evasion, 
money laundering and illegal donation to conservative politicians under French law all 
stemming from the knowledge found in the data from the offshores in Switzerland. However, 
the case is still ongoing as there was also legal disputes regarding Ms. Bettencourt fortune 
who died in 2017. 
42
 
G20’s Legal Ties with Tax Havens and Its Significance  
After the summit in 2009 G20 countries requested each tax haven to sign at least twelve 
information exchange treaties each, by threatening with economic sanctions and thus 
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progressing the combating of tax evasion at a global level, and at the end of 2009 world’s tax 
havens signed almost three hundred treaties with tax havens committing to the OECD tax 
transparency standards. French-Swiss tax treaty amendment played a major part in this 
advancement.
43
  
Based on the research done in Berkeley in 2013 by N. Johannesen and G. Zucman two main 
significances were made, first, that treaties have statistically significant but quite moderate 
impact on tax haven bank fund deposits such as the France-Swiss treaty mentioned above had 
caused approximately 11% decline in deposits held in Switzerland by France citizens. 
However, secondly, the G20 signed treaties with tax havens have not caused significant 
repatriations of funds by the states, instead these individuals and companies have relocated 
their funds and deposits between tax havens. It has been observed that the tax havens which 
have signed the above-mentioned tax treaties have lost deposits at the expense of this, 
however the aggregate data shows that in the period until 2012 the overall value of deposits in 
tax havens have remained overall the same.
44
 
On the other hand, many individuals have not moved their funds from the tax havens and still 
kept them there even after the transparency treaties signed with the tax havens. Some of the 
possible reasons interpreting to why the tax evaders have not moved their deposits from the 
tax havens which have signed the treaties are firstly, because in practice the treaties have not 
considerably increased the possibility of the individuals and they fund flow to be detected, 
namely because only rarely the treaties led to actual exchange of information and rarely seen 
such results as in the case ‘’Affaire Bettencourt’’ noting that the repatriation was triggered 
due to the disclosure of the conversation, rather than the exchange of tax information. As 
noted above the tax information has to be requested by the countries which in turn creates 
difficulties due to research, scrutiny and time to gain the information effectively.  
Secondly, as stated by Ana Maria H. de Alba evaders might have declared only part of their 
assets and funds to the tax authorities while keeping the rest offshore and thus minimizing the 
interest to investigate further their situation. Also, some have been passed by, due to using 
various legal arrangement and tax schemes which are considered legal. In this particular 
example the natural person or the beneficial owner is shielded by limited liabilities companies 
or offshore companies set in tax haven jurisdictions.
45
 
Therefore, under Financial Action Task Force (FATF) the definition of a beneficial owner is a 
natural person who ultimately owns or controls customers whose transactions are made and 
the ownership over person who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or a 
legal arrangement.
46
 Thus, oftentimes corporations have layers of ownership and a very 
complicated structure which are created to protect the ultimate beneficiary. The effect is 
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amplified if jurisdiction have secrecy laws which makes each layer even more difficult to be 
accessed.  
FATF is a policy making body for upholding international financial system integrity and 
combating terrorist financing, money laundering and other related threats. FATF has 
developed a list of recommendations which are recognized as international standards for 
combating the fore mentioned threats and they are a coordinated response to help ensure a 
stable global financial system.
47
 It has become a powerful international body by using peer 
pressure on ongoing basis providing in depth analysis of each countries system for preventing 
criminal abuse of financial system
48
, as well as the threat of blacklisting jurisdictions, thus 
persuading 180 jurisdiction to sign up for their standards. Through their practices they create 
statistics and guidance for implementing their standard and recommendations.
49
 
50
 
Recommendations number 24 and 25 relate to the transparency and beneficial ownership of 
legal persons and arrangements and nr. 18 about internal controls and foreign branches and 
subsidiaries are important with regard to tax havens. Nr. 24 relating to the ownership of legal 
person prescribes that states must take accurate and timely measure to prevent misuse of legal 
person for money laundering and terrorist financing. Nr. 25 relating to the ownership of legal 
arrangement prescribes that countries should take measures by analyzing information on 
express trusts including the settlors, trustees and beneficiaries obtained by competent 
authorities. Lastly, nr 18 suggests that financial institution should implement programs 
against these threats including policies and procedures for sharing information for AML 
purpose.
51
 
Further Development  
Based on the official Swiss statistics and anomalies in the international investment data 
collection in 2013 by Gabriel Zucman shows that approximately 8% of global households’ 
financial wealth is held in tax havens, which translates to around 10% of worlds GDP that is 
held offshore, which constitutes an immense amount of tax revenue loss for the states.
52
 Thus, 
due to the tax treaties much data has been reviled which marks firsts steps towards a global 
fund management transparency. 
In 2016 many tax haven financial centers started to disclose bilateral information about the 
amounts of bank deposits that foreigners hold in their banks. Centers such as Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, Hong Kong and the Channel Islands disclosed this information to Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) which collected and were authorized to disseminate this 
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bilateral data to the media. Calculating that the top 0.1% richest households own about 80% 
of the offshore wealth thus potentially distorting the whole country’s economy in the EU and 
Russia, as the majority of their wealth is held outside of the country and it is not being 
inflowed back into their countries economy. However, the USA wealthiest do not create as 
much of inequality relativity to EU and Russia as many funds are kept and used in the USA, 
however they still are highlighting an effect in a globalized world.
53
 
With regard to the legal framework Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) are 
bilateral treaties signed within the period of 2000 until 2012 with the members of OECD as 
the representative countries who wish to receive the information about their citizens form the 
non-cooperative jurisdiction which have been committed to the OECD’s principles, the 
treaties with one jurisdiction can be up to 12 depending on the interest from the countries. 
The treaties are in accordance with the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) or Country-By-
Country Reports (peer review of how well the information exchange is happening) with the 
purpose of eventually activating the automatic exchange of information mechanism.
54
 
Comparing the bilateral treaties of Federal Republic of Germany with the British Virgin 
Islands (2010), the Kingdom of Sweden with the Bahamas (2010), and the United States of 
America and United Kingdom with the Cayman Islands (2001) for the exchange of 
information relating to tax matters. These bilateral treaties have the same conditions except 
they are made bilaterally rather than multilaterally, thus each state has to make one with a 
jurisdiction. Covering, under article 1, the scope for these agreements covers that the 
competent authorities (ministries, authorized representatives) shall provide the exchange of 
information which is relevant for the contracting parties domestic laws, determination, 
investigation and tax matters (various taxes cover in article 3). 
55
 
Furthermore, exchange of information upon request under article 5 prescribes that the 
requested party shall provide the information upon request in writing about the matters 
relating to and covered in article 1. In case of specific request, the form of depositions of 
witnesses and authenticated copies of original records, to the extent allowed under their 
domestic laws. For the purpose of this agreement the information held by banks, other 
financial institutions and any persons, regarding beneficial ownership of companies, trusts, as 
well as identities, specific evidence on rescuable grounds shall be provided unless it is giving 
rise to disproportionate difficulties. 
56
 
Under article 7 the competent party may decline the request where the requesting party has 
not pursued all the means available in their country, the request is not made in conformity 
with the agreement, where the disclosure of the information would be contrary to the public 
policy of the requested party or information relating to period more than six years prior to the 
considered period. Under article 8, all the information gained shall be treated confidentially 
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and protected, it only shall be disclosed to the relevant authorities or persons and may not be 
used for any other purpose than stated in article 1. 
57
 
During the period from 2009 until today some decision, reports and actions from OECD have 
raised controversy over the laid financial action task plans from experts such as Jean-Pierre 
Lieb arguing that firstly unlike organizations such as United Nations or the European 
Commission, the OECD is not able to enforce or legislate laws, even though OECD is 
connected to these countries and organizations who can enforce obligations it is a slow and 
not always effective process and their recommendations or measures are seen as a soft law, 
which creates incentives for the tax evaders to continue using tax havens until it is a hard law. 
Another social critique is that as OECD is being funded by the tax-payers money, trends are 
seen that instead of conquering the tax payer abuse they are focused more on increasing taxes 
rather than creating equality in the overall abused global framework of tax paying.
58
 
Furthermore, in the latest OECD reports in 2017, every year progress is made in the effective 
implementation of information for tax purposes. The first automatic exchange of tax 
information undertaken by 50 jurisdictions was made in September 2017. It should be noted 
that as mentioned above before jurisdictions were sharing information only upon request 
which made the process not as effective as planned. The implementation levels were 
successful and showing considerable progress, however those jurisdictions with lower ratings 
were given an opportunity advance.
59
 
The changes were as follows improvement in access to accounting records, elimination of 
stick bank secrecy, more effective oversight and enforcement of obligations. Based on the 
OECD report the amount of progress was made due to the round of peer reviews, where 
jurisdictions review each other and are accounted. More jurisdictions are to be a signatory 
parties and further tax treaties and agreements are made and seen that this type of multilateral 
approach is a dominant force in the tax transparency landscape.
60
 
Since 2017, based in the information exchange report from OECD all jurisdictions that are 
signatory of the OECD Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) for the exchange of non-
resident financial account information have implemented domestic legislative frameworks 
and 97% of data has been collected with respect to those non-residence persons. As well as 
the international legal framework for the early adopters should be activated with will create a 
global exchange of information not just bilateral for the members of the Multilateral 
Convention.
61
 
62
 
OECD set international standards with its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 
steps by creating tax planning strategies and rules to tackle multinational companies which 
exploit mismatches between different countries tax rules and exploit these gaps by artificially 
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shifting profits either through a loan or debt schemes or investment schemes to low or no-tax 
jurisdictions. This project was initiated by the G20 in 2012 to address international 
mismatches, digital product sales and delivery regarding to taxation rules, inter-group 
financial transactions referring to the profit shifting between a company’s subsidiaries, 
transfer pricing which occurs when a company has more than one subsidiary and for risk 
management it is transferring assets, risks and makes transactions which have no actual 
economic value, anti-tax avoidance measures. These standards are fundaments for 
international tax avoidance successful diminishment and the exchange of information, peer 
review and monitoring process basis.
63
 
In 2017 over 70 ministries, including jurisdiction from all the continents, have signed the 
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (MLI) which is a multilateral convention of the OECD  developed through 
a negotiation involving more than 100 countries and jurisdictions offering concrete solutions 
for governments to close the gaps in international tax rules adopting and modifying results 
from the BEPS project into eliminating double taxation by creating bilateral tax treaties 
worldwide. As well as improving the dispute resolution mechanisms and setting agreed 
minimums standards against treaty abuse.
64
 
65
 
 
2. USA: Shuttering Foreign Tax Shelters Only to Steal Their Business 
USA together with the G20 was working and trying to combat poverty, update infrastructure 
and lower tax rates for citizens worldwide by uncovering trillions of hidden taxes income 
funds and assets and relieving tax haven shielded beneficiaries. Today, ironically, from 
gathering information from analysis, reports, scholars and practitioners USA has moved from 
one of the top places to transfer funds to the top for foreigner investors to shield their funds 
and assets, thus USA states are becoming one of the world’s favourite tax havens to do so.  
As mentioned above the G20 laid out a Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, accordingly no 
longer tolerating the use of tax havens for illegal and unfair practices. Consequently, the USA 
passed a Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010, requiring all foreign (non-
US) financial institutions to report and declare assets, identities, account balance, etc. of US 
tax payers and potential tax payer to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
66
 
67
 
In order for countries and jurisdiction to comply with the laid-out plans in FATCA, U.S. 
threatened for those who do not comply removing access to the U.S. financial systems and 
markets. Consequently, with this motivation more than 100 jurisdictions and countries have 
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agreed to and are complying with its standards, including tax havens such as Cayman Islands 
and Bermuda.
68
 
69
 
The U.S. was expected to reciprocate and thus as they inquire data from foreign institutions in 
the same manner foreign institutions are willing to inquire information about their citizens 
hiding funds in the U.S. However, in 2016 the congress rejected this repeated request, stating 
that U.S. will not provide the same information its FATCA partners as they do about the U.S. 
financial institutions, because legislation in the U.S. does not yet allow it and further 
legislation in this regard is needed. Most global experts expect it to go nowhere. Adding that 
the U.S. is also gathering data not only about U.S. citizens shielding tax and company 
information in the U.S. but also about foreign individuals and companies incorporated in the 
U.S.
70
 
Following the release of FATCA OECD developed Common Reporting Standard (CRS) in 
response to the G20 request in 2014. This regulation would act similarly to the FATCA, only 
increasing transparency worldwide as the exchange of information would be automatic 
between its parties and on annual basis. With jurisdiction and countries undertaking these 
regulation of automatic exchange USA has not undertaken it nor it is in the status of doing so. 
Interestingly, even as they have failed to adopt the CRS, however they are still actively 
gathering information from foreign countries under FATCA. Thus, as stated by Jesse Drucker 
US is the world’s favourite new tax haven.71 72 73 
Interestingly, in the U.S. Rothschild & Co. a global investment bank paid only $11.5 million 
fine to the U.S. Department of Justice and thus avoided prosecution, however foreign banks, 
especially Swiss banks have paid over $5 billion in fines from the U.S. in 2016 the law office 
‘’Andrew Penny’’ and managing director of Rothschild & Co. made a presentation to their 
inside community members about how the worlds wealthy elite (they) can avoid taxes and 
disclose their funds from their country and the USA, as well as stating that there is no better 
tax haven in the world right now as in the US.
74
 Which is congruent to the above mentioned 
because the rest of the world cannot access the data about their citizens in the US which 
creates their funds untouchable.  
Due to FATCA and OECD’s CRS many U.S. and foreign wealthy are made to move their 
funds. Currently, the safest place to hide money is in the U.S., according to the presentation 
and offers of Rothschild by transferring funds into Nevada limited liability company, in turn 
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making it owned by Nevada trust, it would not only shield these funds from the foreign 
authorities but also from the U.S. as well as generating no U.S. tax returns.
75
 
In addition, as researched by Rupert Neate many public faces and companies such as Donald 
Trump and Hillary Clinton, as well as Apple, Walmart, Coca-Cola and other biggest Fortune 
500 U.S. companies have been using the so-called Delaware tax loophole address of 1209 
North Orange Street in Delaware. An address registered to more than 285,000 entities used to 
avoid and evade tax within the US and abroad. Mainly to gain tax-free royalties on non-
tangible assets such as dividends, intellectual property or public speeches as in case of 
Clintons. This is done by exploiting the state law by transferring all the profits earned to their 
subsidiary in Delaware, because Delaware does not have corporate income tax. 
76
 
77
 
78
 
Interestingly, Apple also has a case against the European Commission for a fee of 13 billion 
euros for gaining illegal tax benefits from Ireland and using Ireland as a tax haven. As Apple 
has an office in Ireland where they pay taxes for their international profit. Thus, Apple were 
acting illegal under EU State aid rules, because Ireland allowed Apple to pay less tax than 
other businesses (from about 12.5% to 0.005%) under Article 108(2) TFEU and consequently 
EU State aid rules require that all funds gained from illegal State aid must be recovered by the 
member state in order to remove the distortion of competition created by this aid.
79
 
80
 
To illustrate the power of the FACTA on an international scope, a latest case of the Latvian 
bank ABLV can be taken as an example. As examined by Frances Coppola the Latvian bank 
did not comply with the regulations and requirements of the U.S. Treasury to comply with the 
requirement to exchange information about its USA clients under FACTA, including the 
information about connected offshore entities which are either connected or established in the 
US. Consequently, ABLV was promptly denied of the U.S. dollar funding and its financial 
market, which means that ABLV cannot effectively make transactions with the US dollar. 
This caused a chain reaction resulting in the banks disorderly collapse and the freeze of all 
payments out of the ABLV by the Latvian regulator and the ECB.
81
 
Tax havens are not expected to disappear anytime soon, as the Swiss banks still hold 
reportedly around $1.9 trillion dollars in assets, however the structure and rules have 
changed. Ironically, USA, the country that was the main driver in sanctioning Swiss banks, is 
becoming the head of the secrecy banking and has not delivered reciprocal transparency as 
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demanded from other countries. Consequently, instead of using its power to shut down its and 
foreign tax havens they steal their business.
82
   
 
3. The Offshore Leaks 
Offshore leaks are the reports and documents of disclosing offshore accounts of wealthy and 
powerful people and companies around the world which also indicated cases of disclosing 
international fraud. It is very important to add this chapter and cover its analysis because 
within the offshore industry this significant moment was an important worldwide discovery 
which made the most of the middle-class people hear or at least be aware of something called 
an offshore, as well as mainly impacted a more deliberate and stronger step taken against the 
abuse by tax havens domestically. This chapter’s aim is to describe a major pushing force for 
the international community and to illustrate a few impacts domestically due to these leaks.   
Offshore Leaks is the term describing the reports obtained by the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in April 2013 disclosing account details cash transferring, 
incorporation dates links between individuals and companies of more than 120,000 offshore 
companies and trusts, as well as 2,5 million files of secret data. These papers caused a 
stronger attention from the world leaders to investigate the wrongdoings. These leaks exposed 
politicians, ultra-rich, con men, arms deal and bribery all over the world. The leaks illustrate 
the tax haven financial secrecy of how the rich and well connected evade taxes and drive 
corruption and economic disorder worldwide. As said by UK’s law scholar Arthur Cockfield 
‘’I’ve never seen anything like this. This secret world has finally been revealed.’’83  
The Panama Papers are leaked detailed documents from the Panamanian law firm Mossack 
Fonseca and corporate services by an anonymous source in 2013, as well records from other 
offshore law firms as Appleby and corporate registrations from jurisdictions such as 
Bahamans, Cook Islands, Malta, Swiss, Cyprus and others. The International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) provided figures and facts such as cash transfers, links 
between companies and individuals, incorporation dates and the fact that these records 
showed holdings from people and companies from more than 170 countries and territories.
84
 
There were the following impacts of offshore leaks. Firstly, it set off and stimulated a wave of 
policy changes, official national and international investigations and high-profile resignations 
around the world. Civil and criminal cases and inquiries were opened in the Germany, Israel, 
India, United States, Australia, United Kingdom and others. In the UK, their officials 
improved the company registry and required the companies to identify the owners of offshore 
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accounts and swore their overseas territories to end corporate secrecy. Austria and 
Luxembourg announced plans to lift bank secrecy. In Belgium new domestic laws were 
passed requiring disclosing offshore holdings. Denmark and Canada made new plans on 
tracking down their citizens with offshore accounts.
85
 
Other countries such as Colombia re-enacted long stalled tax law efforts to tax offshore 
holdings and many companies and officials were raided such as in the scandal of the former 
president of South Korea Chun Doo-Hwan had offshore company and prosecutors are 
aggressively seeking the hidden assets for unpaid fines of $149.3 million. An interconnection 
with this case was the imprisonment in 2017 of Samsung’s head Lee Jae-Yong for five years, 
however he was free after several months for bribery, giving presents and gifts to the 
government to win over the support of the major party for Samsung. He was also convicted 
for hiding assets overseas, concealing criminal proceeds, and perjury in legal confessions.
86
 
87
  
Other cases involved information from registry in Malta where Ivan Simich a Slovenia’s 
former director of national tax administration moved his assets from Slovenia to a company in 
Cyprus. Similarly, Zlatan Kudic also a Slovenian business man whose company owns 
approximately 24 million euro as a tax debt had also hidden these funds in Cyprus.
88
 Another 
scandal happened in Sweden where Leif Ostling head of Scania a major commercial vehicle 
manufacturer had kept all his assets and earnings in Luxemburg also creating a subsidiary for 
moving their dividends, as well as being part of a major lobby from Toyota Consulting in 
Japan and consequently following a resignation due to the revelations.
89
 
90
 
On the other side of the spectrum cases concerning famous artists and stars have also been 
unveiled such as Bono the lead singer of U2 was a shareholder of a shopping centre in 
Lithuania which was a Malta based entity which transferred funds to Guernsey which is a 
jurisdiction which is not charging the corporate tax on profits, the company was fined 35 
thousand euro fine.
91
 As well as the singer Shakira was found in the records of Paradise 
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papers transferring over 30 million dollars of music rights in the island of Malta however 
being in full compliance with the laws.
92
 
However, as it is seen in part I as well as stated by the ICIJ, there are legitimate means of 
using offshore tax havens and it is not said that all the companies and person which are listed 
holding funds in these offshore jurisdiction leaks are illicit or conducting unfair conduct. 
However, ‘’anonymous companies’’ whose owners such as terrorists, tax evaders, drug 
cartels and corrupt politicians do not want to keep their illegally acquired assets under their 
names and thus creates a company or a series of companies to operate their funds.
93
  
The scope of the affected and impacted companies and persons were all around the world by 
the offshore leaks. The collaborations between the investigators and journalists resulted in 
exposing the secret underground world of shadow funds which drew a very high notice and 
interest by the media and the ordinary people worldwide, thus making it a worldwide concern 
also for the EU. The effect was of leaking vast amounts of hidden information about the fiscal 
and tax scheme procedures happening behind the scenes. It can also be noted that the action 
steps and moves taken by global powers such as the G20 and OECD had an impact for 
exposing information by the investigative journalists in 2013 through the improvements of the 
information exchange policies.  
Part II Conclusion  
As any international rules that impact worldwide if they are followed then they consequently 
become an international standard which if not followed would result into a negative effect 
from the rest of the countries, possibly even as a form of sanctions. As the big economy 
countries are signatory countries which follow the rules laid out by the OECD, those rules 
become a standard and thus possess of legal significance. This part covered the main 
advancements and situations in the international sphere and the development of steps taken 
against tax havens and tax avoidance. With lasting effects to come this part also illustrates the 
effect of the investigative journalists on the offshore leaks and the position taken by the USA. 
The strategies and standards made by the OECD are making a subsequent mark within the EU 
and its position to address the topical issue of conquering tax avoidance between and in the 
member states covered in the following part.   
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Part III. Significances within the European Union Regarding Tax and 
Offshore Tax Havens  
 
The part II is aimed at discussing the legal implications by the global powers and their taken 
action when examining the offshore industry, its legal restructuring, caused changes, 
conditions and goals with regard to the tax havens and how they are viewed. Within the part 
II the above chapters were aimed at studying the tax haven situation from the worldwide 
perspective and its caused impact. This chapter will examine and continue to focus narrower 
into the region of European Union and discuss the impacts and consequences which were 
caused within and by the EU, as well as the implications caused and involved within the EU.   
 
1. Europe’s Position  
Tax havens have existed for a long time, however they have become a prominent concern 
especially in the last years since 2008 woldwide, this can be attributed to the globalization of 
different country economies and the exposure of tax avoidance schemes. With taxation and its 
avoidance being in medias’ headlines and tax leaks disclosing new shielded and shadowed 
identities a question of tax jurisdictions and tax schemes have developed into a great 
challenge within the EU. The major issue which the EU has with tax havens are regarding the 
possibility they are providing to both legal and natural persons for tax avoidance, especially 
adding that their secrecy policies allow investors to hide the ultimate beneficiary owner and 
the origin of the gained proceeds which can be illegally and criminally acquired which result 
in losses for the EU.
94
  
Similarly to the OECD, the EU in efforts to initiate good governance between the EU member 
states has also drawn up a list of tax havens categorizing them based on their cooperation 
with tax information exchange policy implementation progress and the EU had made major 
steps towards its goals to against tax evadors starting from the year 2015. In case of the EU a 
tax haven, offshore center, secrecy jurisdiction or a non-cooperative jurisdiction are 
interchangeable terms as they share commonalities which are fundamentally the same 
regarding the issue that the EU is addressing to tackle. 
95
 
The common characteristic is comprising a mechanism which allows escaping taxation 
possible. Such jurisdictions with zero or low taxation policies, tax secrecy and fictitious 
residence is a combination of elements for hiding the ultimate beneficiary and in turn 
facilities the possibility for money laundering. As researched by Aziz Jaafar private and 
public companies using tax havens gain adventages and both should be focused on by the 
regulators, thus arguing that there is significant impact on the european single market.
96
 
Through tax havens, another issue is that by using global and complex tax schemes it creates 
apparent economic activity done by the company rather than an actual, real economic activity 
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which is difficult to identify due to the anonymity provided which lacks the traceability of 
transactions. Thus, in order to tackle tax avoidance, these obstacles have to be removed.
97
 
Due to the economic globalization and digitalization, which simplifies creating links between 
the tax jurisdictions and the flow of money between those tax jurisdiction, and consequently 
through different bank accounts, this makes evading taxes even less restrictive and accessible 
today. The tax jurisdiction is considered a place with a defined authority and territory which 
creates its own tax regulations which are different from other territories within the country 
allowing individuals and companies manipulate tax laws.  
As mentioned by Pierre Moscovici in comparison from the perspective of the EU and the rest 
of the countries tax competition is asymmetric by its nature, which results in tax competition 
between countries, as mentioned before, this competition is beneficial for low tax countries 
where tax havens are established. However, to the contrary of such countries, for high tax and 
large government countries such as the member states of the EU, it creates tax loss, which 
means loss of resources and thus reduced economic activity and unfairness, which 
consequently is lowering the overall growth of the EU. 
98
 
In June 2015, an Action Plan for Fair and Effective Taxation in the EU was presented by the 
Commision creating immediate, medium and long-term measures to fundamentally reform 
corporate taxation within the EU. With the goal that all profits generated within the Single 
Market shall be effectively taxed in the country where the activity takes place. Addressing 
five key areas for action: 1. Re-launching the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB; 2. Ensuring fair taxation where profits are generated; 3. Creating a better business 
environment; 4. Increasing transparency; 5. Improving EU coordination. 
99
 As said by Valdis 
Dombrovskis ‘’Today we have set out an ambitious yet realistic plan for fairer and more 
growth-friendly taxation in the EU.’’100 
The rationale behind establishing a black list of non-cooperative jurisdictions is to bring about 
regulatory compliance and pressure tax havens to apply international tax standards. 
Blacklisting is seen as a tool rather than a solution. The Commission presented in 2016 
external strategy for effective taxation for anti-tax avoidance identifying those who play a 
particular role in tax evasion and avoidance. Assessing 213 countries under the criterion of 
Transparency, Fair Tax Competition and BEPS implementation (refers to tax avoidance 
strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or 
no-tax locations). The reason to why the EU MS were not assessed is because it only refers to 
the external relations of international tax with the EU. 
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The latest updated list of non-cooperative tax jurisdiction was made on March 13 of 2018 
with a list of jurisdiction which refuses to engage with the EU or to address good tax 
governance today are American Samoa, Bahamas, Guam, Namibia, Palau, Samoa, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, US Virgin Islands.  With regard to sanctions, the 
jurisdictions listed are now negatively linked to the EU funding, thus European Fund for 
Sustainable Development (EFSD), the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) and 
the External Lending Mandate (ELM) are not allowed to be channeled, on the ground as seen 
under Article 22 of ESFD of excluded activities.
103
 However, only direct investment will be 
allowed, such as funding projects. The list will be updated once a year following its 
monitoring results.  Additionally, in the final Council Conclusion the EU has listed all the 
countries and their development status which are still considered to be under the non-
cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes regarding the EU.
104
 
However, a criticism made by Oxfam (International charitable organizations focusing on the 
alleviation of global poverty) who applied EU criteria screening 92 countries, including the 
EU, stated that based on the EU criterion its tax haven blacklist should include at least 35 
countries and at least 4 EU countries would be blacklisted as well, if the EU would apply its 
own criteria to its member states, such as the Switzerland, Bermuda (owned by the UK), 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Malta.
105
 
Thus, as described by Aurore Chardonnet Europe’s position is very serious however in a 
progressive development advancing against the tax havens and most importantly against their 
usage for avoiding taxes within and outside the EU as described in the following chapter. The 
Commission argues that these tax avoidances are very degrading in the long run, thus, 
because of the lost money in revenues of large EU companies due to tax avoidance the money 
is not going towards the better life of the EU, such as new schools, public services like trains 
and buses and interchangeably it created higher taxes to the EU families.
106
   
 
2. Europe’s Legislative Position 
Europe’s ambition to create a simpler, fairer and more effective corporate taxation in the EU 
starts with a plan which was made in 2015 which can be effectively categorized under the 
Commission’s Anti-Tax Avoidance Package. This is the Commissions agenda for the fair 
corporate taxation in the EU to prevent aggressive tax planning and upgrade tax transparency 
by creating concrete measures to do so. Thus, this chapter will analyse the timeline of the 
following three categories: effective taxations plan, tax transparency plan, and the better 
business environment. Covering the advances in the EU for tackling tax evasion from 2015 
until 2018.  
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a) Effective Taxation 
In 2015 the EU created an Action Plan for Fair and Effective Taxation setting out reforms to 
corporate tax framework within the EU to tackle the abuse of taxes, ensure sustainable 
revenue and support for a better business environment in the Single Market, addressing five 
key areas, as described above.
107
 Furthermore, the Councils discussion to review Interest and 
Royalties Directive. As in 2011, the Commision adopted a proposal for a common system of 
taxation applicable for interest and royalties payments between companies thus to enlarge the 
scope of Directive 2003/49/EC addressing the problem that the cross-border interest and 
royalty payments are subject to heavier taxation than domestic transactions. However, in 
2015 the Council of the EU rediscussed the anti-abuse clause which would apply as a "de 
minimis" rule preventing member states from granting the benefits of the directive to 
arrangements that are not "genuine", such as made to gain a tax advantage.
108
  
In addition, in June 2015 the Commission communicated its Action Plan discussing work to 
improve Transfer Pricing in the EU. thus, improving the transfer pricing (TP) framework in 
the EU to ensure the taxation of intra-group profits (commercial transactions between two 
companies of the same group simultaneously) is more fairly and linked to the place of activity 
and not to the place which is less tax rigorous.
109
 Guidance and Monitoring of New Rules for 
Patent Boxes made in 2015, which is a special tax regime for intellectual property revenues 
which refers to the reduced tax rate on revenue coming from IP products. Special groups were 
asked to monitor the necessary legislative changes for patent box regimes and start to close 
the regimes to new entrants starting from the end of June 2016 and end all benefits for 
existing claimants by June 2021.
110
  
In December the Councils Conclusion on Code of Conduct Reform was made Addressing that 
a better use of this code must be made in future such as the need to update the criteria and 
adjust the governance of the Code. In 2016 the code had a reform conclusion by the Council 
suggesting the working methods should be updated for even more efficiency and expresses its 
wish to facilitate and support the working group with its dedication.
111
 
The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD 1) Proposal made in January by Commission and 
in June of 2016 the Council already adopted the Directive (EU) 2016/1164 laying down rules 
against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market of 
the EU. Containing five legally-binding anti-abuse measures for aggressive tax planning and 
obliging that member states should apply these measures already from 1 January 2019. 
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Creating, however, a minimum level of protection against corporate tax avoidance within the 
internal market, while ensuring a more stable and fairer environment for businesses.
112
  
The Commission also created a commentary memorandum about its proposal, especially 
examining the Article 9 of the Directive which is targeting the hybrid-mismatch which is 
essentially differences arising from the legal characterisation of an entity or a financial 
instrument originating between a taxpayer in one Member State and an associated enterprise 
in another Member State as well as from a tax structured arrangement between the parties in 
the Member States. Thus, stating that the deduction shall be given only in the Member State 
where such payment has its source.
113
 
Correspondingly, on May of 2017, the Council adopted an Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 2 
(ATAD 2) which is targeting the hybrid mismatches between the third countries and the EU. 
Both Directives are in force, however, the new Directive is amending the Article 9 of ATAD 
1 which is extending the scope of the Article 9 to also the mismatches between EU member 
states and the thirds countries. As well as providing consistent rules with the OECD 
recommendations in the 2015 BEPS Report on Action 2 about Neutralise the Effects of 
Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements preventing double non-taxation practices by eliminating the 
tax benefits of mismatches and ending costly multiple deductions for a single expense rather 
than of multiple foreign tax credits. As researched by Fred van Horzen, ATAD 2 is an 
important milestone against aggressive tax arrangements and will impact the current situation 
of companies and raises a question of will the EU member states harmonize coporate tax 
systems. 
114
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116
 
Recommendation on Tax Treaties were made in January 2016 by the European Commission 
(EU) 2016/136 ‘’on the implementation of measures against tax treaty abuse’’. Stressing that 
companies which benefit from the single market by generating profits should also pay tax on 
those profits in the member state where their activity took place and in the EU, respectively. 
Notting that, tax treaties do create opportunities for tax avoiders for reduced or non-taxation 
through treaty shopping or other abusive strategies and thus measures against treaty abuse 
must be taken. Stating that the general anti-avoidance rules must be based on the principal 
purpose test (PPT) provided by the OECD Model Tax Convention which suggest for a 
multilateral instruments a genuine economic activity or that granting economic benefit must 
be present (Action 6 BEPS report) and preventing the practice of avoiding the permanent 
establishment (PE) status artificially (Action 7 BEPS report).
117
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The External Strategy for Effective Taxation complimenting the anti-tax avoidance measures 
with an objective to secure taxation effectively regarding the third countries, thus leveling the 
playing field and creating the tax haven blacklist described above. The external strategy 
examines tax good governance standard implementation of the third countries through the 
bilateral agreements and state peer to peer practices. As well as, assessing the list of the third 
countries within the black and gray lists also analyzing its criteria for identifying these 
countries and thus reinforcing the link between EU funds and good tax governance 
standards.
119
 
The Creation of the First Common EU list of Third Countries, as already touched upon, 
created in December of 2017 the first-ever list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions was agreed 
upon. However, in 2018 January eight jurisdictions were removed as they complied with the 
international tax standards and following more commitments made by the rest of the 
jurisdictions, where in March 2018 the Council made the following amendment in the list 
assessing the implementation of exchange of information policies set out by the OECD and 
thus 3 jurisdictions removed, 3 added to EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. Bahrain, the 
Marshall Islands, and Saint Lucia were removed from the list and the Bahamas, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis and the US Virgin Islands were added based on the analysis monitored by the EU 
experts.
120
 
Following the work to improve transfer pricing made in 2015 a Proposal on Transfer Pricing 
in 2017 was made firstly in may renewing the mandate for the organization on transfer pricing 
and secondly the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum created a report providing the best practice 
strategies and issuing recommendations for increasing the objectivity and transparency for 
transfer pricing. As well as, including the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (TPG) for 
identifying the commercial relations between the enterprises and the need to control 
transactions for the relevant conditions in the enterprise.
121
  
In addition to the new rules of patent boxes set out in 2015, as in general benefits are given to 
the IP development products and thus encouraging the R&D expenditure and designed to 
result in innovation, the patent boxes are designed to provide tax relief at the later stage of 
innovation cycle when income is generated from the gains of the IP and thus targets the 
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commercial activity and further development of the early product rather than further R&D.  
the process of development is still in process as The Lisbon Strategy is an economic 
development plan seeking to make the EU ‘’the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world’’ and thus the EU is willing to make the IP innovation 
registration within the EU and not offshore.
122
  
 
b) Tax Transparency  
The Proposal for Transparency on Tax Ruling in 2015 the Commission welcomes agreement 
made by member states on automatic exchange of information with the OECD on tax ruling 
BEPS Action 13 creating the Country-by-Country Reporting standards.  All member states 
will be equipped with the information they need to protect their tax bases and assess the 
companies in its country creating a greater cooperation between member states. A remark 
made by Jean-Claude Juncker ‘’It marks a leap forward in our efforts to advance on tax 
coordination and tax harmonisation.’’123 Following by taking the next steps for implementing 
a transparency regulation within the EU which are examined above and further. Latvia’s tax 
transparency laws are implemented within its system in likumi.lv as seen by the OECD 
country profile.
124
 
In 2016 the Commission focused its campaign on boosting tax transparency in order to 
counter tax avoidance and evasion, especially taking into account the media leaks of Panama 
Papers which were leaked in 2015. Due to the abuse of the tax schemes and aggressive 
planning by intermediaries as seen from the offshore leaks such as tax advisors, accountants, 
lawyers and banks have played a crucial role in facilitating wealthy individuals and big 
companies escape fair taxation within the EU.
125
 
Thus, in 2017 the European Commission published the Proposal for a Council Directive 
amending Directive 2011/16/EU about the mandatory automatic exchange of information in 
the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements. Stating that ‘’It is 
thus crucial that information which may escape from the scope of this Directive be captured’’ 
this is intended to capture gap-filling by the intermediaries ‘’through placing an obligation on 
intermediaries to report on potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements.’’ Consequently, 
it imposes an obligation upon intermediaries to report any cross-border arrangement which 
have unclear benefits and are used to reduce taxes (also includes the taxpayers themselves 
also reporting). In the upcoming years, National laws will provide sanctions for non-
compliance and the new reporting obligations would enter into force from 1 January 2019 as 
seen under Article 2 of the Proposal.
126
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The new EU rules on tax ruling come into effect in 2017 to ensure that Member States have 
all the information necessary for multinational companies in other EU countries. As of 2017 
member states are obliged to automatically exchange information on all new cross-border tax 
rulings, thus as seen in Directive 2011/16/EU (mentioned above for the proposal to amend) 
Article 8 where the competent authorities of the EU member states shall exchange 
information automatically, communicating it to the other member states authority regarding 
information that is available from the period of 1 January of 2014 concerning residents in that 
other Member State, concerning the income and capital information.
128
 
 
c) Better Business Environment 
Proposal on Dispute Resolution made in 2016 was crucial for redcuing compliance costs and 
administrative burdens.
129
 in 2017 the Council adopted Directive (EU) 2017/1852 for 
resolving disputes related to the interpretation of tax treaties, in particular, the double taxation 
disputes within in the EU regarding companies and persons. Issues occur when two or more 
countries claim the right to tax the same profits or income made by the company or a person 
which can happen due to different interpretations of bilateral tax treaties or mismatch of 
national rules in case of transfer pricing arrangements between companies subsidiaries or 
persons giving services in two or more countries.
130
 
For illustration purpose the change made by this treaty member states were not always able to 
enforce their judgment on resolving transfer pricing, now, however, there is an obligation to 
arrive at a resolution in all disputes stemming from the tax treaties which affect the businesses 
and citizens tax position. Now the tax payers have a recourse to the national court in case the 
mechanisms is not applied correctly. Before when procedures were taking unpredictable time, 
however not there is a clearly defined period of 18 months in which the arbitration phase has 
to take place. The scope has been extended to all tax disputes arising from tax treaties and 
other relevant international agreement. Mainly, before there was no requirement for 
transparency, now, however, there is an obligation to notify the tax payer and publish an 
abstract of the arbitration decisions.
131
 
In 2016, a Proposal for re-launch of Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
was made by the European Commission. First proposed in March 2011 to create a single set 
of rules for calculating EU corporate tax rates within the single European Market was widely 
considered as a very radical initiative. However, re-visited in arguing the support growth, jobs 
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and investment in the EU and fixing the tax system, making it impossible to take profit from 
one EU member state and then hiding them in a tax haven, letting the enterprise make only 
one tax income statement in one country for all its other incorporated subsidies in other 
member states and currently the reports are processed in the EU for further 
implementation.
132
 
The Proposal consists of two legislative draft directives a proposal for a directive establishing 
a common corporate tax base (CCTB)
133
 and proposal for a directive establishing a common 
consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB).
134
 As seen in both proposals fall within the 
internal market and are facilitating businesses with a single rulebook of corporate tax 
requirements. The aim is not to harmonise tax rates as this falls out of the scope, because it is 
a sovereign right of the member states to do so, however, the two draft directives are dealing 
with taxation to reduce administrative costs for businesses by creating requirements for all the 
28 different corporate taxation systems.
135
 
 
Part III Conclusion  
As seen in this part, Europe has come to a position where it does not want its member states to 
suffer from being cheated in tax money every year by big companies and high net-worth 
individuals which are able to avoid taxes through the help of professional intermediaries by 
creating tax arrangements which target the gaps within the law. With the steps taken by the 
OECD and the G20 countries emphasizing from the year 2008, the EU has made its major 
move to tackle tax avoidance from the year 2015.  
As analysed it has been a very dynamic period for the EU by adopting new proposals and new 
treaties for the EU member states in order to facilitate their combat with tax avoiders through 
the creation of effective taxations laws and proposals, tax transparency initiatives, and the 
better business environment so that member states and its companies and citizens have a more 
sufficient way to calculates taxes without additional burdens and costs and potentially towars 
a single EU taxation system. However, discussion raised by Friedrich Heinemann is whether 
EU should be granted an autonomous tax source and as the finings show this could be 
attributed to the interest of each member state as a sovereign country however a single 
revenue system could contribute towards the whole EU taxation and thus can be limiting tax 
avoidance and decreasing inequality. 
136
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Part IV. Case Examination  
 
This part will focus on illustrating the above-mentioned parts into practice by adding cases to 
those already mentioned within the parts, thus examining cases of well-known companies 
such as IKEA and McDonald’s and individuals such as Leonel Messi and Marcelo Odebrecht 
whose reputation and lives were impacted by their use of specials deals, tax arrangements and 
schemes, which eventually fired back. The purpose of these cases is to research the actual 
practical implication and consequences of using tax havens and tax schemes in order to evade 
or avoid taxes.  
 
1. Transfer-Pricing & State Aided Companies 
IKEA has created a tax scheme and a corporate structure designed for tax avoidance and 
profit shifting already since its founding family started giving out franchise rights in the 
1980s. Reportedly, IKEA has been avoiding 84% of its 14.3 billion yearly royalty income tax 
through the use of tax havens channelled through such countries like Luxembourg and 
Netherlands to Liechtenstein. Within the context of European countries, it has been estimated 
that over a period of six years from 2009 to 2014 EU has lost 1 billion euros in tax revenues 
from IKEA’s legal tax avoidance.  
IKEA has been using the intracompany loan tax scheme basing on the Luxembourg tax laws 
and Belgian interest deduction. Notably, the EU Corporate Tax Package covered above does 
not fully address the tax avoidance scheme, while it has impacted the foreign offshore 
jurisdictions, tax competition between the member states has not been as impacted.
137
 As 
researched by Li Liu from Oxford University large corporation are very elastic with shifting 
profits and do so each time laws change in one of the country they function, however with 
regards to transfer of mispricing in goods is not concentrated in tax havens as goods require 
larger quantities of trade flow and small jurisdictions may not have enough trade flow.
138
 
Thus, in case of IKEA they created the Inter IKEA and made a business model solely 
functioning on royalties.  
IKEA was one of the multinational companies reviled in the 2014 Luxleak offshore leaks by 
the ICIJ disclosing all deals related to these companies in Luxembourg.
139
 In the 1980s when 
IKEA’s business model was transformed into a franchising model it became a company 
operating the franchise business called Inter IKEA which does not own any IKEA shops and 
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in turn it receives a 3% fee of all shops worldwide turnover meaning the collected cash from 
its accounts receivable and inventory investments. Similarly, to Apple, the Commission’s 
investigation led to stating that the tax benefits received by Inter IKEA were unique which are 
not available to other companies’ subject to the same Netherland tax laws. Thus, Luxemburg 
is breaching the Article 107 of the TFEU 
140
 by giving selected companies a better treatment 
which is considered a state aid.
141
  
The corporate tax scheme IKEA was using through signing private deals with and approved 
by the Luxemburg government called Tax Rulings. The first scheme is called Internal Loans, 
this is done by creating an internal loan structure in Luxemburg done by lending money to 
itself overseas and taking it back with interest, thus the international subsidies are paid from 
revenues and then the money is shifted back to the tax friendly Luxemburg where the 
company is tax free and on top of that as the loan was given is comes back with an interest.
 142
 
The second scheme is called Royalty Payments where a Luxemburg subsidiary takes control 
of the companies’ brand name and then charges for its use from the international companies in 
again in the tax friendly Luxemburg. Third tax scheme used is Future Tax Offsets, thus 
turning loses into wins. Consequently, the decrease of the value of the company’s investments 
can be used for tax offsets and thus paying less, such as in a case when the stock prices fall.
143
  
In addition, a similar case regarding transfer pricing arrangements were made by McDonald’s 
which in 2009 restructured its business to also extract billions in royalty fees from its 
Europe’s operations causing a 1-billion-euro loss was found also in the Luxleaks. They 
established a Luxembourg intellectual property holding company with a Swiss branch, which 
was done being able to lower its bills all over EU, as well as this was done right after when 
Luxemburg changed its policy for IP, thus being able to gain significant reduction of tax rates.  
However, as OECD has been alerted and Luxembourg ministry of finance has presented a bill 
containing the abolishment of the Patent Box regime by 2021. 
144
 Likewise, they also moved 
their headquarters from London to Geneva which was reported as for tax purposes.
145
 As 
noted by James G. S. Yang and Victor N. A. Metallo in both cases of IKEA and McDonald’s 
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special tax treatment was made by the governments which are equivalent to illegal tax 
subsidies and thus both have pending cases in the European Court of Justice.
146
 
 
2. Tax Fraud Individuals 
As David Seim suggests, after the 2008 crisis many academics and policymakers have risen 
against what has led to visible wealth inequality, also some to advocate redistribution by 
means of progressive wealth taxation within the system, but this however stimulates the 
wealthy who are being taxed more to find ways to safeguard their wealth.
147
 Especially the 
rise of attention regarding these questions of wealth inequality were raised after the release of 
offshore leaks, as seen in the following cases. 
For illustrating, after the release of the Panama Papers in 2015, the Brazilian authorities 
arrested the billionaire, former CEO Marcelo Odebrecht of Petrobras a Brazilian oil company 
in connection pf bribery and corruption at the state-run oil company. He was arrested and 
reportedly accused on the knowledge of his company’s bribery of around 230 million dollars 
to the politicians, stating that the police have all the documents showing a direct connection 
with contracts within the cartel. This investigation was the biggest political corruption and 
corporate scandal in Brazil putting the economy at risk.
148
 Based on the latest report he was 
sentenced to 19 years in prison but after admitting to guilt and providing evidence to the 
authorities, as well as paying around 30 million in fines his sentence was reduced and under 
the deal, he is put under house arrest.
149
  
A football superstar player celebrity tax fraud case was convicted on Lionel Messi (and his 
father) who was found guilty of defrauding Spain of €4.1m between 2007 and 2009 by using 
tax havens in Uruguay and Belize and a series of shell companies in the UK and Switzerland 
to shield licensing income and royalties from tax authorities. He was found guilty by the 
Spanish supreme court in 2013 and had to stand trial in 2015, he and his father were fined 2 
million each and 21-month prison time. However, currently he has vowed to appeal, and the 
matters are still proceeding.
150
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Part IV Conclusion 
As seen above from the analysis of the cases large conglomerate companies such as IKEA, 
Apple, McDonald’s and others within the Luxleaks list using offshore tax havens through the 
creation of tax arrangements to manipulate the gaps within the laws of different countries 
have been avoiding taxes for years, as well as individuals seen in Panama List using tax 
havens to safeguard their wealth make up a tremendous amount of lost tax money for 
governments. However, as seen in the case of Luxembourg and Ireland these governments 
have made deals to facilitate such activities, one can argue that there is corruption behind it, 
and other can look also at the possible labour opportunities available for the citizens such as 
those given by Apple in Ireland, thus it can be regarded as a twofold situation. 
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Thesis Conclusion 
 
The aim of the thesis was to answer the research question of whether the legal and business 
structure and the views on tax havens have changed after 2008 compared to today and what 
are the peculiarities thereof impacting today's businesses and tax haven jurisdictions through 
the proposed hypothesis and the analysis made within the thesis, accordingly the hypothesis 
has been held as correct as the legal and business structures have changed and the disclosure 
of the shadow economy has opened discussion for conquering the effects of tax havens.   
Thus, the proposed hypothesis was that the world's tax haven position due to global tax 
optimization and jurisdictional transparency issues has been changed, especially with 
significant changes made within the period of 2008 until 2018, influenced by international 
leaders. In turn changing the previous functioning of companies and individuals regarding the 
usage of tax havens, leading tax haven jurisdictions to amend their laws and principles.  
The hypothesis holds true based on the research conducted which disclosed the international 
steps taken by the OECD and G20, such as the transparency rules, implementation of OECD 
recommendation in practice, amendments and bilateral treaties made between the tax havens 
and G20 members and peer reviews. As well as, the comprehension of the huge amount of 
money being hidden in tax havens amounting to trillion euros causing countries to take notice 
and make action.  
As companies have avoided full payments of taxes legally, such as IKEA and McDonald’s the 
amounts are too large to be left without consequences within the EU and as directed by Zoe 
and John Prebble moral and fairness principles are especially important and must be taken 
into consideration as we are all in a social and global environment and these companies still 
face fees and liability issues within the EU, however this has been a move done by the EU 
and not by the member states, fines were not made by the U.S. who however made sanction 
upon tax havens instead, showing that the EU is stepping up as strict regulator addressing the 
wrongdoers.  
Furthermore, the large industry of competitive tax jurisdictions caused by the international tax 
law asymmetry are letting purposely structured tax arrangements take advantage of these 
gaps. In addition, as seen in the Apple case, countries are willing to make deals for the good 
of their citizens to gain workplaces, however these actions are against the fair competition 
principle, as one company is given benefits with others are not. Especially, when deals and 
structures were disclosed by the offshore leaks, new investigations of companies using tax 
havens are pending every day worldwide as many are exploiting the system.  
As states are being cheated it accumulates and becomes a worldwide financial problem as 
stated by Leonce Ndikumana tax havens do facilitate illegal transactions and holding non-
taxed capital inequality further arises, thus measures had to be taken changing the way 
offshore tax haven jurisdictions have been functioning through new regulations, 
recommendations, peer reviews, creating countermeasures from tax scheme analysis, 
imposing an obligation on advisory intermediaries to report illegal activities therefore 
diminishing illegal transactions, fund safeguards, secrecy and creating transparency between 
the information held in tax haven jurisdictions.  
However, Daniel J. Mitchell has a sound argument for the usage and importance of 
jurisdictional tax competition, stating that itis important in a democratic society to create 
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elasticity for businesses and other sources of income for jurisdictions which do not have other 
strong means of generating income such as natural resources. Moreover, income tax is not the 
main source for social services as there are various taxes. Thus, pondering on whether one 
would be able to use half of their income which is taken by tax authorities on their needs 
more effectively or on public issues which people see fit more efficiently is a controversial 
question which is not addressed by states. 
In addition to above mentioned, Steven J. Klees research on the future of education also has 
to be addressed as today most education is public, but funds are not used efficiently enough as 
the level for schooling quality and environment are worsening, thus the next generations are 
potentially being harmed. He imposes the reason for worsening conditions is tax avoidance 
and ineffective usage of the nation’s budget, however if people would earn twice as much 
they would be incentivised for their children to go to private schools rather than public 
schools.  
When observing this global situation from an economic perspective of cause and effect, while 
it is true that there are individuals who use tax havens for illegal purpose, many others use it 
due to the too harsh national tax regimes. Thus, the costlier the regime is, more individuals 
and companies are incentivised to search for alternative means of structuring their business 
and financial wealth to keep more of what they earn. As well as other strict financial laws, as 
proposed by McConvill, Mykola Orlov, Christopher Bickley and others, encourage the use of 
tax havens for operations which are then possible to conduct more effectively.  
Consequently, the research has approved the hypothesis that the world's tax haven position 
has changed due to global tax optimization arrangements. Jurisdictional transparency issues 
are sought out to be conquered by global organizations and large economy countries are 
forcing changes for transparency to limit tax avoidance structures. With especially significant 
changes made within the period of 2008 until 2018 in the international and EU sphere. 
Business and individual functioning has changed as well as new laws are made and current 
tax arrangements are being scrutinised. Tax haven jurisdictions are being categorized as 
cooperative and non-cooperative and forced to amend their principles and laws of secrecy, 
miscommunication and potentially more. Along with new proposals and regulations 
stemming in the EU, which demonstrates exciting changes in the further upcoming years 
within the tax system of the member states and the single market.   
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